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Abstract
Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been pro-
posed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach,
which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we in-
troduce a unied framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding
protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary,
and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's
capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with
his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the
black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these
models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is nally demonstrated on a study case:
Munilla-Peinado distance bounding protocol.
1 Introduction
Desmedt et al. presented at Crypto'87 a new attack called the maa fraud [19] that defeats any
authentication protocol. Based on the chess grandmaster problem [17], this attack allows the
adversary to successfully pass the authentication by relaying the messages between a verier
and a legitimate prover. When it was introduced, the maa fraud appeared somehow unrealistic
because the legitimate prover is required to be involved in the execution of the protocol without
being aware of the manoeuvre.
Maa fraud in RFID. The maa fraud has been recently resurrected with the deployment
of ubiquitous computing systems, especially those based on passive RFID. Whatever the capa-
bilities of RFID tags, from a simple memory to a powerful contactless smartcard, they all share
the particularity that they answer to the reader's requests without any agreement or awareness
of their holder. This clearly opens the door to maa frauds.
To illustrate this concern, consider a payment system based on contactless credit cards [15,
59]. An adversary would like to \buy" an expensive good without paying it herself. An accom-
plice is located in the changing room of a swimming pool and scans all the lockers until nding
one containing a contactless credit card. Once found, the adversary forwards to her accomplice
all the requests from the payment terminal of the merchant. The accomplice sends them to
the credit card, receives its responses, which are in turn forwarded to the payment terminal
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through the accomplice and the adversary. The communication between the adversary and her
accomplice can be set up, for example, using mobile phones. One may argue that the merchant
will detect the attack. However, some payment systems are based on the NFC-friendly cell-
phones and this still facilitates the masquerade because the merchant is not able to see that the
cell-phone performs a maa fraud.
Feasibility of the maa fraud. The messages between the verier and the prover are relayed
at a very low level, denitely below the application layer where the cryptographic messages are
sent. Therefore, the attack can be performed even if the adversary has no clue about what
is exchanged in the application layer. In 2005, Hancke [28] demonstrated a maa fraud which
can be performed while the two colluders are 50 meters apart and connected through a radio-
channel. This is long enough to perform the attack in a waiting line in front of a ticket machine.
This attack was applied to RFID but the authors in [24,25,29,37,42] point out that some other
domains are targeted by the maa fraud. Recently, Adam Laurie published on Internet some
tool to carry out a maa fraud with o-the-self RFID devices [41]. This work puts the maa
fraud accessible to everyone.
In 2007, Halvac and Rosa [27] noticed that the standard ISO 14443 [34] widely deployed
in secure applications can easily be abused by a maa fraud due to the lax timeouts in the
communication. Indeed, the standard ISO 14443 species a frame waiting time (FWT) in which
the reader is allowed to retransmit or give up the communication if the queried tag remains
unresponsive while the FWT is over. However, when the tag needs more time to process the
information it receives, it can impose the reader to increase the FWT up to 4.949 second. Such
a timeout is long-enough to carry out a maa fraud over thousands kilometers.
Distance bounding protocols. The rst countermeasure against maa fraud, called dis-
tance bounding protocol, was suggested by Desmedt et al. [7, 8] by introducing the distance
bounding concept based on the measurement of the round trip time of exchanged messages.
Brands and Chaum [10] then designed the rst distance bounding protocol based on the ideas
of Desmedt et al. in order to mitigate or thwart the relay attacks.
Since then, many works about distance bounding have been published [6, 10{14, 21, 30, 35,
38,39,43,45{47,52,54,55,57,58,60], which include variants of the problem and improvements of
the solutions. Unfortunately, all of them address the problem in a pedestrian way, which leads
to confused or erroneous analysis. For example, the maa fraud (e.g., [19]) is also known as a
relay attack (e.g., [6, 27, 28, 31, 37, 38, 49, 52]), a chess grandmaster problem (e.g, [8, 17]), or a
wormhole problem (e.g., [32, 33]). The distance fraud (e.g., [38, 46, 50]) is also considered as a
relay attack while there is here no relay. Also, some papers consider the prover has a full access
to its internal state (e.g., [7]) while he can only observe it in some other papers (e.g., [45]).
Contribution. Given the current state of the art, comparing the existing protocols is an
unfair and challenging task, due to the lack of formalism. While distance bounding protocols
are on our doorstep [48,51], the goal of this paper is to ll this gap.
Section 2 provides a thorough analysis of the terminology that is used or should be used in
the distance bounding domain. This work does not simply consist in collecting denitions from
the literature. Indeed, it distinguishes the historical terminology used in the distance bounding
domain from the one used nowadays in most of the publications. This allows to provide new
and { hopefully { unambiguous denitions, and to classify the three generic frauds considered
in recent works: maa, terrorist, and distance frauds.
Section 3 denes a generic model for the adversary. This model is fundamental to assess the
security of distance bounding protocols. We particularly explore the adversary capabilities and
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strategies. We emphasize that our aim is to supply a generic model but, nevertheless precise
enough to be useful in the protocol analysis. For example, we derive from our model several
adversary strategies that should be considered when analyzing a distance bounding protocol,
but we do not claim that these strategies are the only possible ones. They somehow dene the
minimum requirements one may expect from a distance bounding protocol.
Section 4 introduces a new view on the prover compared to previous works. We consider
the black-box and white-box models and show the relations between the maa, terrorist, and
distance frauds with respect to these models. We show that some equivalences exist between
these frauds. This reduces the number of cases to deal with when analyzing a distance bounding
protocol. This new approach also points out that some previous works underestimate the success
probability of the adversary, and emphasizes the need of a clear denition of the adversary
capabilities when designing a new protocol.
Finally, Section 5 is a study case of an interesting protocol proposed by Munilla and
Peinado [46]. We underline that our aim is not to exhibit weaknesses in this protocol, but
to illustrate how our framework allows to rene the security analysis.
2 Towards some Unied Concepts for RFID
In what follows, we consider a two-party communication protocol. First, we dene the man-in-
the-middle attack and the relay attack. Then, the concept of distance bounding is introduced.
2.1 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Denition 1 (Man-In-The-Middle Attack). A man-in-the-middle (MITM) is a form of attack,
where the adversary provokes or manipulates the communication between two parties. Manipu-
lating the communication means relay, withhold, or insert messages.
Remark 1. In RFID, a MITM practically consists in a rogue reader and a rogue tag each located
close to a party and connected through a communication link.
Some early papers also consider a weaker form of adversary who is not able to withhold or
insert a message. We then speak about relay attacks.
Denition 2 (Relay Attack). A relay attack is a form of man-in-the-middle where the adversary
manipulates the communication by only relaying the verbatim messages between two parties.
Remark 2. Typically, a relay attack can be mounted by an adversary who does not know the
protocol used by the parties. This case is realistic in practice and appears in RFID when the
communication protocols do not follow any open standard.
2.2 From Authentication to Distance Bounding
As a prelude to distance bounding, we consider two classes of protocols that are authentication
and distance checking, both strongly related to our problem. Authentication is a well-known
concept already dened in many classical textbooks, and Denition 3 is excerpted from [44].
Denition 3 (Authentication). An authentication is a process whereby one party is assured
(through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a second party involved in a
protocol, and that the second has actually participated ( i.e., is active at, or immediately prior
to, the time evidence is acquired).
In the same vein, we dene distance checking.
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Denition 4 (Distance Checking). A distance checking is a process whereby one party is assured
(through acquisition of corroborative evidence) that a given property on its distance to a second
party involved in a protocol is satised at some point in the protocol. The area where the property
is satised is called the neighborhood of the verifying party.
Remark 3. Denition 4 does not suggest any distance property. Given that we target RFID,
the Euclidean distance1 is the most meaningful and used in the literature [6,10{12,21,30,38,39,
43,45{47,52,54,57,58]. Depending on the considered protocol, the property can be for example
an upper-bound or a lower-bound on the distance between the two parties. Some other works
consider dierent distances, for example distance checking protocols to counter wormholes in
wireless networks [13,14,32,33].
Remark 4. In an authentication protocol, an attack succeeds if an adversary impersonates a
legitimate user. In the same way, an attack against a distance checking protocol succeeds if she
makes the verier believe that she satises the distance property while she does not.
Most of the security-related RFID applications require both authentication and distance
checking, which leads to the concept of distance bounding.
Denition 5 (Distance Bounding). A distance bounding is a process that combines both authen-
tication and distance-checking. Moreover, the property that is veried in the distance checking
is an upper bound on the distance between the two parties.
Remark 5. We say that a distance bounding protocol is sound if the verier rejects with over-
whelming probability when the prover is not legitimate and/or is outside of the neighborhood,
and correct if, when no attack occurs, the verier accepts with overwhelming probability when
the legitimate prover is within the neighborhood.
Reader
Tag
Figure 1: Tag in the neighborhood of a reader.
2.3 Distance Bounding Mitigates MITM Attacks
Distance bounding protocols can be used in such environments to protect either the prover,
i.e., the tag, or the verier, i.e., the reader. Indeed, a tag should not be authenticated without
explicit agreement of its holder. Since such an explicit agreement is not available in (low-cost)
RFID. Therefore, the presence of the tag in the neighborhood of the reader (Figure 1) is an
implicit agreement of authentication. On the other side, the reader may require the presence of
the tag during the authentication especially when considering physical access control.
However, Remark 5 is particularly important to understand the goals and the limitations
of the RFID distance bounding. Indeed, such a protocol ensures that a given tag is within
the environment of the reader, but cannot conclude anything about the fact that a MITM
1In such a case, distance ranging is also used as synonym of distance checking.
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occurs between the two parties. In other words, a distance bounding protocol is not expected to
distinguish the scenario represented in Figure 1 and those represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Although distance bounding does not avoid any MITM in theory, it can be used to mitigate
them in practice when the neighborhood of an RFID reader is small enough that any attack
within this zone is detectable. Note that distance bounding protocols may so not be suitable
for RFID systems with long-range reading. As an illustration, one may cite the Identify Friend
or Foe (IFF) [3, 22] system: an enemy aircraft approaching its target may defeat a detection
radar by impersonating a friend aircraft if such one is present within the detection zone.
2.4 Frauds on Distance Bounding
In what follows, we assume that the RFID reader is honest that is it properly follows the
denition of the protocol. As commonly admitted, we assume that no two competing attacks
occurs during a same instance of the protocol. We dene four types of fraud that are illustrated
in Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6.
Denition 6 (Impersonation Fraud). Given a distance bounding protocol, an impersonation
fraud is an attack where a lonely prover purports to be another one.
Denition 7 (Distance Fraud). Given a distance bounding protocol, a distance fraud is an
attack where a dishonest and lonely prover purports to be in the neighborhood of the verier.
Example 1. Home connement is a legal measure by which a person is conned by the authorities
to his residence, when prison is not an appropriate measure. Electronic monitoring was originally
Adversary
Reader
Tag
Figure 2: MITM with an inside adversary.
Reader
Tag
Adversary
Figure 3: MITM with an outside adversary.
Adversary
Reader
Figure 4: Impersonation Fraud.
Tag
Reader
Figure 5: Distance Fraud.
Adversary
Tag
Reader
Figure 6: Maa/Terrorist Frauds.
5
developed at Harvard in the 1960s, and the rst judicially sanctioned program using monitoring
devices was launched in 1983 in New Mexico [40]. People as (in)famous as Bernard Mado and
Paris Hilton already beneted from such an electronic monitoring using an ankle bracelet. With
such a measure where travels are restricted, a distance attack is denitely relevant, in order to
allow the person under monitoring to leave his residence without being detected.
Denition 8 (Maa Fraud). A maa fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance
bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between the reader and an honest tag
located outside the neighborhood.
Example 2. Consider a payment system based on contactless credit cards, for example [15,59].
An adversary would like to \buy" an expensive good without paying it herself. An accomplice
is located in the changing room of a swimming pool and scans all the lockers until nding one
containing a contactless credit card. Once found, the attack can start: the adversary forwards
to her accomplice all the requests from the payment terminal of the merchant. The accomplice
sends them to the credit card, receives its responses, which are in turn forwarded to the payment
terminal through the accomplice and the adversary.
Denition 9 (Terrorist Fraud). A terrorist fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a
distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) between the reader and a dishon-
est tag located outside of the neighborhood, such that the latter actively helps the adversary to
maximize her attack success probability, without giving to her any advantage for future attacks.
Example 3. The terrorist attack also makes sense in the case of home connement because the
arrested person may benet from the help of an accomplice who stays close to the monitoring
system while the person under control is away. In such a case, a terrorist fraud is needed because
the ankle bracelet cannot be physically removed except by the authorities.
Following the four frauds described above, one may observe that three degenerated cases
could also be considered: impersonation, maa, and terrorist frauds when the adversary is
outside the neighborhood. These frauds, depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 8, are not considered
because they are weaker than the general corresponding frauds. Note that degenerated distance
fraud is neither addressed because self-impersonation does not make sense.
Reader
Adversary
Figure 7: Degenerated Impersonation.
Tag
Reader
Adversary
Figure 8: Degenerated Maa / Terrorist Frauds.
2.5 Terminology
In 1976, Conway [17] introduced the chess grandmaster problem where a little girl - who does
not know how to play chess - plays in parallel two correspondence games against two chess
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grandmasters. By only relaying the moves of the grandmasters, she eventually draws or wins
against one of them. Based on the chess postal problem, maa and terrorist frauds have been
both originally proposed by Desmedt, Goutier, and Bengio at Crypto 87 [19], then extended with
Brassard and Quisquater in [7]. Their goal was to prove that the Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge
protocol [23] was weaker than what was claimed by Shamir when he said that his protocol is
secure even being executed one million times in a Maa-owned store [26]. Hence, maa and
terrorist frauds are also meaningful outside of the scope of distance bounding.
Beth and Desmedt [8] introduced the distance bounding as a countermeasure to these frauds,
not as a primary goal. Brands and Chaum [10] then designed the rst distance bounding protocol
based on the ideas of Desmedt et al.. Up to our knowledge, the rst distance bounding protocol
devoted to RFID is due to Hancke and Kuhn [30].
Since then, most of the works about distance bounding [6, 10{14,21,30,35,38,39, 43,45{47,
52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60] are related to physical devices and consider maa and terrorist frauds as
dened in this paper, not in the original broad sense.
Note that although many papers about RFID consider maa and terrorist frauds as relay
attacks, we emphasize that they are MITM attacks but not necessarily relay attacks. In the
general literature, maa fraud is synonym of chess grandmaster attack [1, 8] and middleman
attack [4, 18]. In RFID, maa fraud is the terminology that should be used.
Also, distance bounding [6, 10{14, 21, 30, 35, 38, 39, 43, 45{47, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 60] is synonym
of proximity check in the RFID literature.
3 Adversary Capabilities and Strategies
Below, we introduce the round trip time (RTT) that is the keystone of distance bounding. We
then provide a model for the adversary capabilities. Regarding the frauds dene in Section 2,
the adversary might be a third party or the prover himself. Finally, we present some strategies
to counteract the distance bounding protocol.
3.1 Distance Bounding Protocols Based on the Round Trip Time
There exists several solutions to estimate the distance between two devices. For instance, one
can measure the received signal strength indication (RSSI) [62], use the global positioning system
(GPS) [60] or perform multi-channels communication [2,56]. These methods are either insecure,
e.g., the RSSI can be modied by the adversary and can be uctuating (indoor/outdoor), or
unsuitable to the RFID constraints: a GPS receiver is too expensive to be added to a low-cost
RFID and the physical layer is too simple to allow multi-channels communication.
All the papers on distance bounding in RFID [6, 10{14, 21, 30, 35, 38, 39, 43, 45{47, 52, 54,
55, 57, 58, 60] consider that the most promising solution to evaluate the distance between two
parties consists in measuring the Round Trip Time (RTT). By measuring the RTT of a message,
the sender can estimate an upper bound on its distance to the recipient, given that it cannot
propagate faster than the light. This solution only requires a single trusted clock on the reader
side and no hardware modication for the tag.
Among the existing distance bounding protocols based on RTT, one may distinguish two
main families: characterized by the fact that a nal signed message is or not required to end the
protocol. The nal signature can be computed on the challenges and the responses only, or on
some other informations, e.g., the nonces. The rst family has been introduced by Brands and
Chaum [10]. Later on, Hancke and Kuhn [30] proposed a protocol in which there is no need of
a nal signature. The protocol execution nishes when the measurement of the RTTs is done.
Both protocols can be implemented using symmetric-key cryptography.
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Brands and Chaum's protocol consists of three phases: the rst and nal ones are denoted
slow phases, and the second one is called fast phase. The RTT is measured n times during the
fast phase, while the slow phases include all the time-consuming operations; in particular the
nal slow phase is used to complete the authentication. On the other side, Hancke and Kuhn's
protocol consists of a single slow phase followed by a fast one with n RTTs measured. In this
case, the fast phase allows the verier to check both authentication and distance.
Most of existing works are based on either Hancke and Kuhn's family [6,30,38,47,52,57] or
on Brands and Chaum's family [10, 39, 45, 46, 54]. The protocol proposed in [58] can be viewed
as an \hybrid" protocol: there is a succession of slow phases and fast phases.
Remark 6. The authentication security parameters of Hancke and Kuhn's protocol and Brands
and Chaum's protocol are not the same: in the early case the authentication security parameters
are the key size, the nonce sizes and the number of fast phase rounds; in the latter case they
are the nonce sizes, the key size and the signature size.
In the sequel, Hancke and Kuhn's protocol (HK) [30] is used to illustrate some concepts.
The protocol can be briey described as follows. The verier sends a nonce Nv to the prover.
The prover replies a nonce Np. From those nonces, and a shared secret k, both prover and
verier compute H = f(k;Nv; Np) where f is a pseudorandom function. The value H is then
split to obtain two n-bit registers R0 and R1. During the fast phase, the verier picks a random
bit ci and sends it to the prover. The prover replies R
ci
i the i-th bit of the register R
ci .
3.2 Adversary Capabilities
In this section, we dene the generic capabilities of the adversary. Achieving a realistic and fair
model requires bounds on these capabilities. Two dierent restrictions are provided below.
3.2.1 Dolev-Yao Model
We consider in our framework a Dolev-Yao adversary [20]. In such a model, the adversary
cannot perform unbounded computations and cannot obtain the keys of honest parties. The
latter assumption is nevertheless relaxed with the terrorist and distance frauds, where the prover
has access to the keys. However, he disagrees to share these keys with any third party.
Designing a distance bounding protocol also requires to dene two other bounds on both
number of protocol runs executed by the third adversary, and number of cryptographic opera-
tions carried on by the tag within one execution. The former bound is discussed below while
the latter bound is discussed in Section 4.
3.2.2 Bound on the Number of Protocol Executions
When executing several times the protocol from scratch does not give to the adversary any
signicant advantage, the security analysis can consider only one protocol execution. However,
some protocols do not resist to multiple executions, for example the success probability of a
maa fraud with the original HK protocol [30]2 is (34)
n if only one execution is considered, while
it is 1 when the adversary can run twice the protocol with the same challenge.
3.3 Adversary Strategies for Querying a Prover
Our framework provides three strategies that unify all the existing attacks on distance bounding
protocols. The rst two strategies depend on the moment the prover is queried by the adversary.
2There exists two HK protocols. One with only one nonce sent from the verier, and the other is described
in the previous section. We are speaking here about the former.
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These two strategies can be applied to any type of attack scenarios dened in Section 2.
Pre-ask strategy. The adversary relays the rst slow phase between the verier and the
prover, then { before the verier starts the fast phase { executes the fast phase with the prover.
Afterward, she carries on the fast phase with the legitimate verier. She can also nally relay
the nal slow phase, if any. With such a strategy, the adversary can for example obtain one
register among two in Hancke and Kuhn's protocol, or she can retrieve the random values in
Brands and Chaum's protocol.
Post-ask strategy. As in the previous strategy, the adversary relays the rst slow phase.
Afterward, she executes the fast phase with the verier without asking the prover. Then,
she queries the prover with the correct challenges received during the fast phase. Finally, she
relays the nal slow phase. This strategy only makes sense if such a nal slow phase exists. For
example, an adversary can randomly answer to the verier in the Brands and Chaum's protocol,
and nally apply a post-ask strategy by querying the prover with the right challenges in order
to get the valid signature.
The two previous strategies are used to retrieve informations. In a distance fraud, the early-
reply strategy is combined with one of these strategies. In a maa or a terrorist fraud, the
early-reply is useless in the regular cases, the adversary is already inside of the neighborhood.
However, the strategy should be considered in the degenerated case study.
Early-reply strategy. In this strategy, the adversary, located outside of the neighborhood,
relays the rst slow phase. During the fast phase, her strategy is to anticipate the challenge:
she replies before she is supposed to do so. Finally, she relays the potential nal slow phase,
if any. Using this strategy aects the RTT measurement. Hence the adversary deceives the
verier on his location. This strategy was rst described by Brands and Chaum [10].
Remark 7. In some articles (e.g., [39]), a fourth strategy is mentioned, where the adversary
does not interact at all with the prover during the whole attack. This is actually a classical
impersonation that is not specic to distance bounding, and so not considered in this paper.
Nevertheless, authors of distance bounding protocols must pay attention to this attack especially
when if the length of the secret is small regarding the number of rounds.
4 Prover Model
Up to our knowledge, all works addressing the distance bounding problem consider that the
prover has full control on the execution of the algorithm. This is not always relevant in RFID,
where one may clearly distinguish the Human prover from the prover's device. We model these
concepts by introducing the black-box [9, 61] and white-box [16, 53] models in our framework.
This allows to rene the success probabilities of an adversary and point out that some published
works underestimate the success probabilities when the prover has a full control on the execution
of the algorithm.
4.1 Tampering Capabilities of the Prover
Denition 10 (Black-box model). In a black-box model, the prover cannot observe or tamper
with the execution of the algorithm.
Denition 11 (White-box model). In a white-box model, the prover has full access to the
implementation of the algorithm and a complete control over the execution environment.
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Remark 8. We emphasize that the two models only concern the capability of the prover in
observing or tampering with the execution of the algorithm. Indeed, a man-in-the-middle
adversary is neither able to directly observe nor to tamper with the execution of the algorithm
performed by the prover. This implies that these models are not relevant when considering the
impersonation fraud (Denition 6), and they are equivalent when considering the maa fraud
(Denition 8), as it will be stressed in Section 4.4.
4.2 Computing Capabilities of the Prover
Section 3.2 addresses the adversary capabilities in terms of protocol executions. It states that,
when executing the protocol several times does not increase the success probability of the
adversary in the next executions, the security analysis can consider only one execution. This
limitation also applies to the prover when the latter is malicious, i.e., in distance fraud and
terrorist fraud.
In the white-box model, restricting the computation capabilities of the prover within one
protocol execution is also required. This computation bound should be provided by the designers
of distance bounding protocols and the security analysis should be based on it, which is not
done in the existing literature. We illustrate this issue, by analyzing the resistance of HK [30]
faced to a distance fraud in the white-box model, and show with a numerical example that the
adversary almost certainly wins if there is a 1-second latency between the slow and fast phases.
In order to increase her success probability when performing a distance fraud against HK,
the prover can exploit the fact that the verier is the rst party who commits. Using the
notations dened in Section 3, we can state that the success probability of the adversary is
increased when dH(R
0
i ; R
1
i ), the hamming distance between R
0 and R1 is low. This case occurs
if the prover runs the pseudo-random function as many as possible and keep the optimal nonce
that maximizes the number of pairs (R0i ; R
1
i ) where R
0
i = R
1
i . \As many as possible" is the
bound that should be provided by the designer of the distance bounding protocol.
More precisely, the prover succeeds in a given round of the protocol with probability 1 if
R0 = R1 and probability 12 otherwise. For a i 2 f0;    ; ng, we obtain so the success probability
of the adversary when considering the distance fraud against HK:
Pr(successjdH(R0; R1) = i) =

1
2
i
; (1)
where dH denotes the Hamming distance. Let X be a random variable that represents the value
of the Hamming distance between R0 and R1. We have:
Pr(X = x) =
 
n
x

2n
; 0  x  n:
Suppose from now that the prover is allowed to run p times the pseudo-random function
f dened in Section 3. For all i in f1; : : : ; pg, let Xi be the random variable associated to
dH(R
0; R1) produced by f(k;NV ; Ni) with Ni being the nonce tested by the adversary at the
i-th tries. We dene Y = min(X1; : : : ; Xp).
For any y such that 0  y < n and i such that i 2 f1; : : : ; pg, we dene the event Ayi :
exactly i among p Xjs are equal to y, and the p   i remaining are strictly greater than y. As
the Xjs are independent and follow the same distribution, we can dene a random variable X
following the same distribution as the Xjs, and conclude:
Pr (Ayi ) =

p
i

Pr(X = y)iPr(X > y)p i: (2)
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Hence, we deduce that, for a given 0  y < n, Y is equal to y if one of the events Ayi occurs,
i.e., fY = yg = Si=pi=1Ayi . The Ayi s are such that they are pairwise disjoint, so the probability
that Y is equal to y is:
P(Y = y) =
i=pX
i=1
P (Ayi ) : (3)
Then, from Equation (2) and Equation (3), we compute:
Pr(Y = y) =
1
2pn
0@0@i=nX
j=y

n
j
1Ap  
0@ i=nX
j=y+1

n
j
1Ap1A : (4)
The special case where Y = n occurs if all the random variables Xj = n for all j such that
1  j  p. As previously, we dene the random variable X following the same distribution as
the Xjs and obtain:
Pr(Y = n) = (Pr(X = n))p =
1
2np
: (5)
Now, we can calculate, Psucc, the success probability of the adversary when she is allowed
to run p times the pseudo-random function between the slow and fast phases of HK in order to
carry out a distance fraud as:
Psucc =
i=pX
i=0
Pr(successjY = i)  Pr(Y = i):
Finally, Equation (4), Equation (5), and Equation (1) yields:
Psucc =
1
2pn

0@i=n 1X
i=0

1
2
i

240@j=nX
j=i

n
j
1Ap  
0@ j=nX
j=i+1

n
j
1Ap35+ 1
1A :
Figure 9 shows this success probability when p is between 1 and 223, for n = 20,40,60,80 and
128, i.e., some common values found in the literature [5, 38, 39, 50]. p = 223 is still a realistic
value and roughly represents the number of hashes that can be computed today per second on a
single PC. Note that we consider here the white-box model, which justies that the prover can
use a computer more powerful than an RFID tag in order to carry out the attack. The gure
clearly illustrates that the success probability quickly increases up-to 1 when p increases, while
the value usually claimed in the literature is
 
3
4
n
[38].
4.3 Distance Between Verier and Prover
There exists some distance bounding protocols in which each response bit depends on some
previous challenges during the fast phase [6,57]. Considering such protocols, an adversary who
tries to cheat on the distance may receive some of the previous challenges that may increase
the success probability of the attack. Receiving the previous challenges depends on how far
the prover is away from the verier. Assume a prover just outside of the neighborhood cannot
receive the current challenge ci however, can receive all the previous challenges to produce a
current response ri. As she diverges from the verier after a certain range she cannot receive
also ci 1, and so on. This causes the appearance of some concentric neighborhoods around
the verier which is addressed in [36]. The success probability of the attack may increase as
the prover locates in a closer region between those neighborhoods. Thus, while analyzing the
security against either distance or terrorist fraud, with the early-reply strategy, the region of
the prover should be considered.
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Figure 9: Adversary success probability for given registers of length n and depending on the
number of pseudo random function runs.
4.4 Relations Between the Frauds and the Models
Figure 10 presents the relation between the frauds when considering the white-box and black-
box models. An arrow from A to B means that: for any attack in A that succeeds with
probability pA, then there exists an attack in B that succeeds with probability pB such that
pB  pA. To ensure fairness in the analysis, we bound the adversary to one protocol execution
with the prover, and the prover is not allowed to perform more cryptographic operations than
what is dened in the protocol.
White−box model
Terrorist fraud Terrorist fraud
Mafia fraud Mafia fraud
Distance fraudDistance fraud
Black−box model
Figure 10: Relations between the frauds in the white-box and black-box models.
4.4.1 Relations Between the Models
Distance fraud. The adversary is the prover in a distance fraud. Because she has access to
more information in the white box model, her success probability is obviously greater or equal
in the white-box model than in the black box model.
Maa fraud. The prover does not collude with the adversary in the maa fraud. Because
the output of an honest prover is independent of the considered model, the success probability
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of the adversary is the same in both white-box model and black-box model. This proves the
equivalence stated in Figure 10.
Terrorist fraud. The prover colludes with the adversary in the terrorist fraud. Similarly to
the distance fraud, the prover has access to more information in the white box model than in
the black model, and so does the adversary. This proves the implication from the black-box
model to the white-box model.
4.4.2 Relations Between the Frauds
Maa fraud vs terrorist fraud. In the black-box model, the prover cannot observe or
tamper with the execution of the algorithm. Consequently, even if the prover colludes with the
adversary, he has no way to provide information that the adversary would not be able to obtain
herself. This clearly proves that maa fraud and terrorist fraud are equivalent in the black box
model. In the white-box model, the prover has access to more information than in the black-box
model; because the prover colludes with the adversary, the success probability of the adversary
is at least as high in the white-box model as in the black-box one. This proves the implication.
Distance fraud vs terrorist fraud. In both models, if a dishonest prover is able to carry
on a distance fraud, he also can mount a terrorist fraud with the same or higher probability.
Indeed, with some help from an accomplice who only relays his answers, the malicious prover
capable of a distance fraud will have the capability to execute a terrorist fraud.
Remark 9. Given the previous relations, analyzing the security of a distance bounding protocol
requires to consider only 4 cases: distance fraud in the black-box model, distance fraud in
the white-box model, terrorist fraud in the white-box model, and maa fraud in the black-box
model (or equivalently maa fraud in the white-box model, or terrorist fraud in the black-box
model).
Remark 10. Clearly dening the prover model is quite important in the security analysis of the
distance bounding protocols. This has never been done before, which led to incorrect security
proofs in the literature. Indeed, some articles implicitly consider the white-box model, but the
prover is only oered to look at the execution of the algorithm, without being able to intervene
in its execution. In such a case, the adversary is not optimal and the so-called best success
probability is underestimated.
5 Study Case: Munilla and Peinado's Protocol
In this section we apply our framework to a protocol proposed by Munilla and Peinado [46].
This protocol is a variant of Hancke and Kuhn's protocol [30]. In this analysis, we consider
both black-box and white-box prover model and we compute the success probabilities of each
fraud. First, we give a more precise upper bound than the one found in [46] for the adversary
success probability using a pre-ask strategy. Moreover, we analyze another modied protocol
suggested by the authors in [46]. We show that the security level of this version is lower than
what they expected.
5.1 Protocol Description
In order to decrease the adversary success probability in maa-fraud probability of Hancke and
Kuhn's protocol [30], Munilla and Peinado introduce the concept of void challenges in [45, 46].
The basic idea is that challenges can be 0, 1, or void meaning in such a case that no challenge
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is sent. Prover and verier agree on which challenges should be void. Upon reception of 0 or
1 while a void challenge was expected, the prover detects the attack and gives up the protocol.
The prover and the verier share a secret k and agree on (a) a security parameter n, (b) a
public hash function f whose output size is 3n bits, and (c) a given timing bound tmax.
Slow phase 1. V and P exchange nonces NV and NP and compute H = f(k;NP ; NV ) to
obtain three registers as follows: T = H1 : : :Hn, H
0 = Hn+1 : : : H2n and H
1 = H2n+1 : : : H3n.
Fast phase. Each Ti decides whether ci is a void challenge (Ti = 0) or not (Ti = 1). In the
latter case, ci will be either 0 or 1, and will be called a full challenge. If a full challenge is
received and Ti = 1, the prover answers ri = H
ci
i as in Hancke and Kuhn. If a void challenge is
received and Ti = 0, the prover stays silent. Otherwise, the prover detects an attack and aborts
the protocol.
Slow phase 2. Upon termination of the fast phase, the prover sends f(k;H0;H1) to the
verier to conrm that no attack was detected. The protocol succeeds when the fast phase
succeeds, i.e., the RTTs measured by the verier are correct, and the nal signature is valid.
Remark 11. It should be noticed that in the original paper [45], the authors have not specied
explicitly if it is the verier or the prover who sends its nonce rst. So any choice is possible.
Figure 11 suggests that it is the verier.
Prover Verier
slow phase
generate NP generate NV
NV                   
NP                  !
H = f(k;NP ; NV ) H = f(k;NP ; NV )
T = H1 : : : Hn T = H1 : : : Hn
H0 = Hn+1 : : :H2n H
0 = Hn+1 : : :H2n
H1 = H2n+1 : : : H3n H
1 = H2n+1 : : : H3n
fast phase
for i = 1; : : : ; n:
if Ti = 0, void challenge, otherwise
pick a bit ci
ci                   start timer
ri = H
ci
i
ri                 ! stop timer
slow phase
No attack detected
f(k;H0;H1)                 !
Figure 11: Munilla and Peinado's protocol.
5.2 Computation of the Impersonation Success Probability
In the impersonation attack, the adversary must successfully answer to the challenges during
the fast phase and to guess the nal signature. In what follows we denote pf the probability
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that a full challenge is expected by the prover and the verier. Let psign be the probability that
the adversary successfully forges the signature.
Two cases should be considered for analyzing the fast phase: (a) When a challenge is void,
the adversary denitely knows that the right answer is also void. The probability of this event
is (1   pf )  1. (b) When a challenge is full (dierent from void), the adversary replies with
an arbitrary answer. The probability that this event occurs and that the adversary gives the
correct answer to the verier is pf  12 . The probability of impersonation is given by:
pimp =

1  pf
2
n  psign: (6)
Note that depending on the function f , obtaining the optimal psign can be reached by
randomly guessing the signature or by randomly picking k and computing the right signature.
5.3 Computation of the Maa Fraud Success Probability
We remind that black-box and white-box models are equivalent when considering the maa
fraud, as stated in Section 4. The adversary achieves her attack with one of the following
strategies.
Post-ask strategy. The adversary rst executes the fast phase with the verier, trying to
guess the right answers and learning the registers T . Afterward, knowing the T register she
executes the fast phase with the prover in order to obtain the acknowledgment signature. The
adversary succeeds with the same probability as in the impersonation attack except that she
does not have to predict the signature. Her success probability is:
ppost ask =

1  pf
2
n
: (7)
Pre-ask strategy. In order to carry out the attack, the adversary executes the protocol with
the prover and the verier respectively. We dene three events:
 A: The event that the adversary is not detected by the prover and gets the nal signature,
i.e., she sends a void challenge if and only if a void challenge is expected.
 A: The event that the adversary is detected by the prover in at least one round of the
fast phase and does not get the nal signature.
 S: The event that the adversary succeeds the protocol executed by the verier.
The adversary can accomplish the attack in two cases (a) she is not detected by the prover
during the fast phase, gets the nal signature, and she gives the correct answers to the verier
(probability P (S \A)) , and (b) she is detected by the prover during the fast phase, and she
gives the correct responses to the verier and predict the nal signature (probability P (S \ A)).
Thus, success probability of the adversary is equal to:
P (S) = P (S \A) + P (S \ A): (8)
When the prover is queried by the adversary, the latter can obtain the value H0i correspond-
ing to the ith full challenge for i = 1 : : : n. Then, when she executes the fast phase with the
verier, and is challenged by the latter, the following cases occurs:
 the challenge is a void challenge, and the adversary knows the answer,
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 the response expected is from register H0, she knows the answer,
 the response expected is from register H1, she randomly guesses the answer.
In each round the adversary wins without being detected if (i) she sends a void challenge to
the prover when a void challenge is expected, or (ii) she sends a full challenge to the prover when
a full challenge is expected, and she sends the correct responses to the verier. The probability
of the former is equal to (1 pf )  (1 pc) where pc is the probability that the adversary sends at
a given round a full challenge to the prover. The probability of the latter is equal to pf  pc  34 .
Since the adversary has to be successful in each of the n fast round then the success probability
without being detected is:
P (S \A) = [(1  pf )  (1  pc) + pf  pc  3=4]n: (9)
Let us assume that the adversary is detected at the jth round by the prover and completes
the protocol with the verier. The success probability of this event is computed below:
P (S \ Aj) = [(1  pf )  (1  pc)  1 + pf  pc  3=4]j 1
 [(1  pf )  pc  1 + pf  (1  pc)  1=2]
 [(1  pf )  1 + pf  1=2]n j  psign: (10)
where Aj is the event that the adversary is detected at the j
th round by the prover. From the
Equation 10, the probability that the adversary succeeds with being detected in any round is
computed as follows:
P (S \ A) = psign 
nX
j=1
([(1  pf )  (1  pc)  1 + pf  pc  3=4]j 1
 [(1  pf )  pc  1 + pf  (1  pc)  1=2]
 [(1  pf )  1 + pf  1=2]n j): (11)
We notice that if the adversary is detected by the prover, the latter becomes mute, and she
does not get the nal signature. In this case, she has to guess this signature, but this highly
reduces the success probability which can be neglected. Hence, from Equation 8, Equation 9
and Equation 11 the success probability of the adversary can be considered as follows.
P (S) = P (S \A)
= [(1  pf )  (1  pc)  1 + pf  pc  3=4]n: (12)
In order to maximize the attack probability, the optimal pc values for each pf value can be
computed from Equation 12:
pc =
8<:
0; if 0  pf < 4=7;
1; if 4=7 < pf  1;
any; if pf = 4=7:
(13)
By combining Equation 12 and Equation 13 the success probability for pre-ask strategy is:
ppre ask =

(1  pf )n if 0  pf < 4=7
(pf  34)n if 4=7 < pf  1
(14)
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Comparison between the strategies. We now compare the dierent adversary strategies.
By combining Equation 7 and Equation 14, we nd the equality between the two strategies
when pf = 0:8. Hence, to maximize to success probability the adversary chooses the pre-ask
strategy for pf > 0:8, otherwise she prefers the post-ask strategy. Below, we provide the optimal
maa fraud success probability, (pmaf), regarding pf :
pmaf =

ppost ask if pf < 0:8;
ppre ask if pf > 0:8:
(15)
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Figure 12: Attack success probability depending on pf for a given number of rounds n = 20.
Remark 12 (Notes on Munilla and Peinado's Results). In the original paper [46], the authors
consider an upper bound for the pre-ask strategy:
pmp pre ask =

3
4
 pf
n
: (16)
This bound is convenient for the authors [46] to compute the average success probability
of the adversary. Figure 12 shows that our result, ppre ask, is more accurate than the original
bound pmp pre ask.
5.4 Computation of the Terrorist Fraud Success Probability
In the white-box model, the registers H0 and H1 are provided to the adversary by the prover
without any leakage on long term key. Therefore, the terrorist fraud is always achieved with
probability equal to one. As stated in Section 4, the terrorist fraud is equivalent to the maa
fraud in the the black-box model.
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5.5 Computation of the Distance Fraud Success Probability
As mentioned in Section 4, the adversary carries out the early-reply strategy in the white-box
and black-box models.
5.5.1 White-Box Model
We remind that we assume that the verier sends his nonce rst. The adversary may run the
hash function one or several times with dierent random nonces depending on her capability.
Therefore, we analyze two dierent adversary capabilities in this model. Moreover, combining
an early-reply strategy with a post-ask or pre-ask strategies does not make sense. The adversary
does not need to query the tag to get a specic register or a nal signature: she has everything
at hand.
Restricted adversary. The adversary is allowed to run only once the hash function to com-
pute H0 and H1. The adversary is provided all the registers used in the protocol. She knows
whenever a void challenge or a full challenge is expected in each round. If H0i = H
1
i and the
challenge is full, she replies the good answer with probability 1. Otherwise, H0i 6= H1i and the
challenge is full, her early reply is correct with probability 12 . The probability Pcorrect to send
the correct reply when a full challenge is expected is Pcorrect =
3
4 . When the void challenge
occurs, she waits until next challenge. After the fast phase, the adversary always produces a
valid nal signature. Hence the success probability of the distance fraud (Pdist) is computed as
follows:
Pdist = ((1  pf )  1 + pf  Pcorrect)n: (17)
With Pcorrect =
3
4 , we have Pdist = (1 
pf
4 )
n. Moreover, this case also corresponds to a protocol
in which the prover sends its nonce rst, i.e., the prover can not tamper with any of the registers.
Powerful adversary. Assume that the adversary is allowed to run the hash function 223
times with dierent inputs. In this case Equation 17 still applies but she can minimize the
Hamming distance dH(H
0, H1) between the two registers to obtain Pcorrect  1. Indeed, after
running the hash function 223 times, the adversary keeps the best run, i.e., the run such that
dH(H
0;H1) is minimum. Let, dH(H
0;H1) be equal to k (0  k  n) for that given run. The
probability that the adversary gives the correct answer when a full challenge is expected is then:
Pr(correctjdH(H0;H1) = k) = 1  k
n
 1
2
:
The previous probability yields Pcorrect, the probability that, when a full challenge is ex-
pected, the adversary sends a correct response:
Pcorrect =
i=nX
i=0
Pr(correctjdH(H0;H1) = i)  Pr(dH(H0;H1) = i) = 1  1
2
 E
 
dH(H
0;H1)

n
;
where E
 
dH(H
0;H1)

is the expected Hamming distance between H0 and H1 after running
223 times the hash function.
Table 1 shows the eect of the register length on the probability Pcorrect for an adversary
able to try 223 operations. Increasing the register length decreases slowly Pcorrect and the overall
success probability of the distance fraud. We emphasize the need for the prover to send its nonce
Np rst in the slow phase.
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Length n of H i 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 Pcorrect 1 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87
Table 1: Probability Pcorrect for a powerful adversary.
5.5.2 Black-Box Model
The adversary is not able to observe the contents of H0 and H1 in order to increase the success
probability of her early-reply strategy. Therefore, she needs to query the tag to gain information.
She can use the pre-ask or the post-ask strategies.
Post-ask strategy. The adversary does not know when a void challenge or a full challenge
is expected contrarily to the post-ask for the maa fraud or the terrorist fraud. She tries to
anticipate the challenge. The only advantage gained by the adversary is the nal signature.
Two cases have to be considered for analyzing the fast phase: a) the adversary should predict
when a void challenge occurs; b) the adversary should predict when a full challenge occurs and
she should reply with the correct answer. As previously, let pc denote the probability of sending
a full challenge. The distance fraud success probability Pdist for this strategy is:
Pdist =

(1  pc)  (1  pf ) + pc  pf  1
2
n
:
The optimal value for pc is zero if pf < 2=3; otherwise, pc = 1. For any strategy, the success
probability of the adversary is upper bounded by
 pf
2
n
.
Pre-ask strategy. The adversary rst queries the tag and then executes the fast phase an-
ticipating the challenge. The adversary utilizes the pre-ask strategy used in the maa fraud.
However, in this case, the adversary does not know the value of the verier's challenge. There-
fore, the adversary uses another strategy to produce an answer to the challenge. In each round,
if a full challenge occurs, she sends to the verier the response from the register obtained by
querying the tag. With this approach, when a full challenge occurs, the probability of succeed-
ing one round of the fast phase is 3=4 because in half of the cases, the verier sends a challenge
corresponding to the adversary answer thus she wins; in other half of the cases, there is still 1=2
chance that the response is correct. Similarly to the computation of the success probability of
the pre-ask strategy in the maa fraud, the probability of success for the distance fraud Pdist is
given by:
Pdist =

(1  pc)  (1  pf ) + pc  pf  3
4
n
:
The optimal value for pc is one, if pf < 4=7; otherwise, zero. For any strategy, the success
probability of the adversary is upper bounded by
 
pf  34
n
.
In this case, the pre-ask strategy have the best success probability. Hence, this strategy
assesses the security of the protocol regarding to distance fraud.
5.6 Modied Version of Munilla and Peinado's Protocol
In [46], the authors propose another version of the protocol and claim that it still provides better
security level than Hancke and Kuhn's protocol [30]. In this version, they propose to generate
3n+1 bits (f(k;NP ; NV ) = H1   H3n+1). As in the original version of the protocol, a register
T is used to dene if we have a void challenge or a full challenge. It is assumed here that pf =
3
4 ,
so 2n are needed to produce the register T . The value f01; 10; 11g are mapped to 1 and f00g
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is mapped to 0 in T . The remaining n + 1 bits are used to answer to the verier challenges.
The least signicant bit or most signicant bit is taken out from this register, depending on
the challenges. For instance, if the challenge is zero the prover takes the response from the left
edge, otherwise from the right edge. Once a bit has been used, it is deleted. We show that this
approach dramatically decreases the security level of the protocol.
5.6.1 The Maa Security Analysis
Using the post-ask strategy the success probability of the adversary is the same as the one
provided by Equation 7. In what follows, we show that the success probability of the adversary
is greater than what is claimed in [46].
Pre-ask strategy. From the pre-ask strategy used in the original protocol, it is observed that
there are two optimal conditions for the adversary. For some values of pf , the adversary always
sends full challenges to the prover and for the others, she only sends void challenges.
Assuming that the adversary always sends full challenges to the prover, she succeeds the
protocol executed on the prover side with probability pnf . However, she only learns n bits of
the register, and one bit remains unknown. When she queried the prover, if the adversary
successfully guessed which bit is not used during the fast phase executed with verier, she
succeeds her attack with probability pnf . Otherwise, one bit is unknown and she must try a
response at random, so her success probability is 12  pnf . Since the verier produces the full
challenges with probability 1=2, the bit not used during the fast phase will be in the middle of
the register with high probability.
Assuming that the bit not used in the protocol is the one in the middle, the number of ones
and the number of zeros in the register is n=2. There is only
 
n
n=2

combinations of registers
fullling this assumption. Since the total number of combinations is 2n, the probability that
the unused bit is in the middle of the register is
 
n
n=2

=2n.
When the adversary uses a strategy to get all the responses from the prover except the bit
in the middle of the register, the probability of success when performing a maa fraud with the
pre-ask strategy is:
1
2
 pnf 
 
1 +
 
n
n=2

2n
!
: (18)
Assuming that the adversary sends only void challenges, her success probability is (1  pf )n.
Comparing the strategies. Figure 13 depicts the adversary success probabilities for each
strategy, depending on pf , when considering a 20-bit register. For comparison, we additionally
provide the success probability of HK.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a systematic method has been proposed to analyze distance bounding protocols.
The fair evaluations provided by our framework can be used to design or analyze distance
bounding protocols. We dened the capabilities and strategies of the adversary and illustrated
our framework on the distance bounding protocol of Munilla and Peinado [46]. For the maa
fraud, we showed a more precise upper bound than the one found in [46] for the adversary
success probability using a pre-ask strategy. We also proved that the security level of the
evolved version of the protocol is lower than what is claimed in [46].
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Figure 13: Attack success probability depending on pf for a given number of rounds n = 20.
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